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INTRODUCTION

The Florida Legislature enacted a statute providing counsel to children
in certain categories in dependency cases, and also passed a statute removing
the nexus requirement to prove grounds for termination of parental rights.1
Both laws are a substantial departure from prior practice and contain serious
flaws, which are discussed in this survey.2 The Supreme Court of Florida ruled
on one case during the past year, interpreting Florida’s speedy trial rule in
juvenile delinquency cases.3 Intermediate appellate courts remained active both
in the delinquency area and in the dependency field.4 This survey reviews and
analyzes the new laws and the significant reported opinions in these areas.5

*
Professor of Law, Nova Southeastern University Shepard Broad Law Center.
This survey covers cases decided during the period from July 1, 2013 through June 30, 2014.
The author thanks Law Review Subscriptions Editor, Richard Nelson, for his help in the
preparation of this survey.
1.
FLA. STAT. §§ 39.01305, .806(1)(f), (h) (2014); FLA. STAT. § 39.806(1)(f), (h)
(2013).
2.
See FLA. STAT. §§ 39.01305, .806(1)(f), (h) (2014); FLA. STAT. § 39.806
(2013); infra Part VII.
3.
State v. S.A., 133 So. 3d 506, 507 (Fla. 2014) (per curiam).
4.
E.g., Weiand v. State, 129 So. 3d 434, 434 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2013).
5.
See infra Parts I–V.
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DEPENDENCY

Chapter 39 of the Florida Statutes and the Florida Juvenile Rules of
Civil Procedure provide for notice and an opportunity to be heard at multiple
points in the dependency proceeding, including sections of chapter 39 that
provide that, unless parental rights have been terminated, parents must be
notified of all proceedings and hearings involving the child.6 Despite the clear
language of chapter 39 and the Rules of Juvenile Procedure, the Second District
Court of Appeal was obligated to reverse in In re J.B. v. Department of
Children & Family Services7 because the trial court failed to give the parents
adequate notice and an opportunity to prepare for a permanency hearing.8 The
appeal involved a dependency proceeding in which the parents did not comply
with the case plan, and a scheduled judicial review was set.9 Before the hearing,
the Department, according to the appellate court, “apparently abandoned the
goal of reunification and decided to seek a permanent guardianship.”10 Because
the hearing was noticed as a judicial review and not a permanency hearing, the
parents knew nothing about the change in plans.11 In fact, “[f]orty-three pages
into the transcript—[according to the appellate court]—the Department first
explained that it actually wanted an order at the conclusion of [the] hearing
establishing a permanent guardianship and a termination of supervision.”12
Over the objections of the child’s father’s attorney, the trial court proceeded
with the matter, apparently not seeming to understand the impact of its ruling.13
The appellate court reversed.14
In dependency proceedings in Florida, by statute, the parties are: The
parents, the Department of Children and Families, the Guardian Ad Litem
(“GAL”) Program or a representative of the GAL Program if appointed, the
child, and the petitioner, whether the Department or someone else.15 Chapter 39
6.
FLA. STAT. § 39.502(1) (2014); FLA. R. JUV. P. 8.045(h); FLA. R. JUV. P.
8.225(f)(1) (providing notice). When these rules do not require specific notice, all parties will be
given reasonable notice of any hearings. FLA. STAT. § 39.502(1).
7.
130 So. 3d 753 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2014).
8.
In re J.B., 130 So. 3d at 754, 757; see also FLA. STAT. § 39.502(1); FLA. R.
JUV. P. 8.225(f)(1).
9.
In re J.B., 130 So. 3d at 754.
10.
Id.
11.
Id. at 754–55.
12.
Id. at 755.
13.
Id. at 755–56.
14.
In re J.B., 130 So. 3d at 757.
15.
FLA. STAT. § 39.01(51) (2014). For a discussion of the roles of the parties in
Florida see Michael J. Dale & Louis M. Reidenberg, Providing Attorneys for Children in
Dependency and Termination of Parental Rights Proceedings in Florida: The Issue Updated, 35
NOVA L. REV. 305, 323–32 (2011).
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also recognizes that in child welfare proceedings in Florida, a participant may
also be involved in the case.16 A participant is defined as a non-party who
receives notice of hearing and “includ[es] the actual custodian of the child, the
foster parents, . . . the legal custodian of the child, identified prospective
parents, and any other person whose participation may be in the best interest of
the child.”17 A mother of five children in D.C. v. J.M.18 filed a writ of certiorari
in the appellate court to quash a pre-trial order on the foster parent’s motion to
intervene.19 The trial court’s order provided that, in addition to the other
parties, the foster parent’s attorney would have the right to unfettered review of
all court files in the case.20 The mother, the GAL Program, and the attorney ad
litem for one of the half siblings all objected and joined in the writ.21 They
claimed an invasion of privacy rights by the third party foster parent.22
Recognizing that chapter 39 does not allow foster parents to receive every
record in a confidential dependency case and that the order departed from an
essential constitutional requirement, the appellate court granted the writ and
quashed the trial court order.23
In any dependency proceeding, of course, the petitioner must prove the
allegations contained in the petition by a preponderance of the evidence.24 In
H.C. v. Department of Children & Family Services,25 a father appealed from an
order adjudicating the children dependent based upon a finding of abuse, in that
there were bruises on one of his children’s left side as well as a purple loop
mark.26 The case arose when the children’s mother, who was separated from the
father, noticed the mark after the children returned from the father’s care.27
“The [court’s] expert, . . . a nurse practitioner with the University of Miami’s
Child Protection [Unit],28 testified that,” in her opinion, the “injury
‘represent[ed] child physical abuse.’”29 The problem was that there was no

16.
FLA. STAT. § 39.01(50).
17.
Id.
18.
133 So. 3d 1080 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2014).
19.
Id. at 1081.
20.
Id.
21.
Id.
22.
Id.
23.
FLA. STAT. § 39.0132(3) (2014); D.C., 133 So. 3d at 1081–82.
24.
FLA. STAT. § 39.507(1)(b).
25.
141 So. 3d 243 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2014).
26.
Id. at 243.
27.
Id. at 244.
28.
Id.; see also FLA. STAT. § 39.303(1)(e). The Child Protection Units are
operated by the State’s Health Department to medically evaluate possible child abuse and neglect.
See FLA. STAT. § 39.303(1).
29.
H.C., 141 So. 3d at 244.
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evidence of who did it.30 As the appellate court explained, “the record is
completely devoid of any evidence that the [f]ather caused [the child’s]
injuries.”31 Thus, the court of appeals found that the petitioner, “the
Department, failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the
[f]ather” probably was the person who inflicted the injuries, and, on that basis, it
reversed.32
An issue which regularly arises in the dependency context in Florida is
whether the neglect or abuse of one child is sufficient, in and of itself, to prove
that a parent’s other children are also dependent.33 The case law, going back
twenty years, requires that there must be a nexus between the injuries to one
child, or other neglect of that child, and proof that the other children are
dependent.34 This was the issue in W.R. v. Department of Children &
Families,35 a case in which “[a] father appeal[ed] [from] an order [declaring] his
. . . children dependent.”36 The appellate court affirmed as to one child, but
reversed as to the other.37 The finding by the trial court as to the second child
was based upon “one incident where the father struck the child,” but there was
no evidence of harm.38 There was not even a bruise.39 Relying on the body of
prior case law, the appellate court explained that, “[t]he trial court failed to
make any finding [with] regard[] to the risk of imminent abuse,” and failed to
show there was “a nexus between the parent’s abuse of the one child and the
risk of abuse of [the other] child.”40 Significantly, the Florida Legislature
statutorily removed the nexus requirement during the 2014 Legislative
Session.41 Whether the removal is constitutional is described in Part VII,
Legislative Changes.42

30.
Id. at 245.
31.
Id.
32.
Id.
33.
E.g., R.F. v. Fla. Dep’t of Children & Families (In re M.F.), 770 So. 2d 1189,
1193 (Fla. 2000) (per curiam).
34.
Padgett v. Dep’t of Health & Rehabilitative Servs., 577 So. 2d 565, 571 (Fla.
1991); W.R. v. Dep't of Children & Families, 137 So. 3d 1078, 1079 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
2014); C.M. v. Dep’t of Children & Family Servs. (In re S.M.), 997 So. 2d 513, 515 (Fla. 2d Dist.
Ct. App. 2008).
35.
137 So. 3d 1078 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2014).
36.
Id. at 1079.
37.
Id.
38.
Id.
39.
Id.
40.
W.R., 137 So. 3d at 1079–80.
41.
Compare FLA. STAT. § 39.806(1)(f) (2014), with FLA. STAT. § 39.806(1)(f)
(2013).
42.
See infra Part VII.
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As noted earlier, foster parents can be participants in dependency
proceedings.43 As the recipients of children who are in the state-operated foster
care system, foster parents are required to comply with licensing regulations.44
In Sanders v. Department of Children & Families,45 foster parents appealed
from a decision of the Department of Children and Families revoking their
foster care license on the basis of a hearing officer’s recommendation.46 The
case arose from the foster parents’ employment of corporal punishment on a
foster child in their house.47 Admitting that they struck the child, causing a
bruise visible several days later, the foster parents on appeal claimed that the
action of the Department interfered with their religious curriculum or teachings
in violation of Florida law.48 The appellate court affirmed the decision of the
Department.49 It held that Florida law does not deprive “the Department of the
authority to prohibit corporal punishment,” and that appellants’ claim of
invasion of their religious rights must fail because they should not have entered
into the contract if they believed that the contract violated their constitutional
rights.50
During the course of a dependency proceeding, often after adjudication
and the disposition, a parent may make a motion for reunification.51 When the
parent does so, the court shall hold a hearing in which the “parent [is obligated
to] demonstrate that the safety, [welfare], and physical, mental, and emotional
health of the [parent’s] child” will not suffer from endangerment by the
change.52 In a rather simple case on appeal, A.M. v. Department of Children &
Families,53 a mother appealed from a trial court’s denial of a motion for
reunification.54 Apparently, there was no evidence in the record that the mother,
through counsel, actually moved for reunification.55 Nor was there an order

43.

FLA. STAT. § 39.01(50) (2014); see also supra notes 15–17 and accompanying

text.
44.
Sanders v. Dep’t Children & Families, 118 So. 3d 899, 901 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct.
App. 2013); see also FLA. STAT. § 409.175(1)(b).
45.
118 So. 3d 899 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2013).
46.
Id. at 900.
47.
Id.
48.
Id.; see also FLA. STAT. § 409.175(1)(b).
49.
Sanders, 118 So. 3d at 901; see also FLA. STAT. § 409.175(1)(b).
50.
Sanders, 118 So. 3d at 901; see also FLA. STAT. § 409.175(1)(b).
51.
FLA. STAT. § 39.621(9).
52.
Id.
53.
118 So. 3d 998 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2013) (per curiam).
54.
Id. at 998.
55.
Id.
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deciding the motion for reunification in the record.56 For these simple reasons,
the appellate court upheld the decision below.57
III.

TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS

The issue of the failure of parents to appear at termination of parental
rights proceedings has come up in appellate court on numerous occasions in
Florida.58 Under Florida law, it is possible for a court to enter a consent to the
termination of parental rights.59 However, while the Florida statute governing
the failure to appear may be grounds for termination of parental rights,60 the
question remains as to the circumstances underlying the failure to appear,
including the possibility that the parent appeared on one of several days in the
proceeding.61 In C.S. v. Department of Children & Families,62 the mother and
father appealed from a judgment terminating their parental rights on the basis of
the entry of a consent when they failed to appear.63 The appellate court
affirmed, finding that the court did not rule solely on the basis of the failure to
appear, but also on the facts of the case.64 The appellate court also noted that
“[t]he trial court found the mother’s excuse for [not appearing] not to be
credible.”65 However, there was a very strong dissent by Judge Warner.66
Apparently, “the parents appeared on the first two days of the adjudicatory
hearing and failed to appear on the third day, [which was] scheduled three
months later.”67 Relying on case law holding that a consent should not be
entered where a parent does not appear at part of the hearing, Judge Warner
would have granted the appeal on that ground.68

56.
Id.
57.
Id. at 998–99.
58.
See J.M. v. Dep’t of Children & Families, 9 So. 3d 34, 35 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 2009); Michael J. Dale, 2013 Survey of Juvenile Law, 38 NOVA L. REV. 81, 86–87 (2013)
[hereinafter Dale, 2013 Survey of Juvenile Law]; Michael J. Dale, 2012 Survey of Juvenile Law,
37 NOVA L. REV. 333, 342–46 (2013) [hereinafter Dale, 2012 Survey of Juvenile Law].
59.
FLA. STAT. § 39.801(3)(d) (2014); see also J.M., 9 So. 3d at 36.
60.
FLA. STAT. § 39.801(3)(d).
61.
See Nickerson v. Dep’t of Children & Families, 718 So. 2d 373, 373–74 (Fla.
3d Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
62.
124 So. 3d 978 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2013) (per curiam), review denied,
135 So. 3d 286 (Fla. 2014).
63.
Id. at 979.
64.
Id.
65.
Id. at 980.
66.
Id. (Warner, J., dissenting).
67.
C.S., 124 So. 3d at 980 (Warner, J., dissenting).
68.
Id.
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Florida provides for termination of parental rights on numerous
grounds—abuse, neglect, and abandonment.69 Abandonment, as defined in the
Florida Statutes, is a situation where the parent “has made no significant
contribution to the child’s care and maintenance.”70 It includes a lack of
frequent contact with the child where marginal efforts or token visits are not
enough.71 In S.L. v. Department of Children and Families,72 a mother appealed
from an adjudication terminating her parental rights on grounds of continuing
abuse, neglect, or abandonment.73 The appellate court affirmed in part and
reversed in part, finding that the trial court erred in basing the termination on
abandonment.74 Looking at the facts, the appellate court held that the mother
had at least twenty-six visits over a one-year period with her children, and that
record contained “testimony indicat[ing] there may have been other visits . . .
not memorialized in . . . Department records.”75 There was also evidence of
telephone communications and provision of clothing, shoes, snacks, food, and
other gifts.76 In a second case, J.E. v. Department of Children and Families,77
the appellate court affirmed a finding of abandonment by the father by clear and
convincing evidence.78 The court found that he failed to demonstrate financial
ability to support the children or the capacity to do so, having last paid support
three months prior to the trial.79 In addition, his visitation was infrequent and
irregular, causing the child not to see her father as a parent.80 Finally, the court
affirmed because the parent failed to substantially comply with the case plan, a
separate ground for termination of parental rights.81 The problem with the
Florida Statute, as evidenced by the two cases described above, is that the
language in the law is imprecise, containing no timeframes or other specific
elements in the test of abandonment.82
Termination of parental rights in Florida, as in other jurisdictions,
requires first, a finding by clear and convincing evidence that the grounds for

69.
FLA. STAT. § 39.806(1)(e)(1) (2014).
70.
Id. § 39.01(1).
71.
Id.
72.
120 So. 3d 75 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2013) (per curiam).
73.
Id. at 76.
74.
Id. at 77.
75.
Id.
76.
Id.
77.
126 So. 3d 424 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2013).
78.
Id. at 428.
79.
Id.
80.
Id.
81.
Id. at 430; see also FLA. STAT. § 39.806(1)(e)(1) (2014).
82.
See FLA. STAT. § 39.806(1)(e); S.L. v. Dep’t of Children & Families, 120 So.
3d 75, 77 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2013) (per curiam); J.E., 126 So. 3d at 428.
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termination exist83 and second, that termination is in the manifest best interests
of the child.84 Third, in Florida, termination must be the least restrictive
alternative.85 In the case K.D. v. Department of Children & Family Services (In
re Z.C. II),86 parents appealed a final judgment terminating parental rights to
twin sons.87 The case had previously been on appeal.88 In the first decision, the
appellate court held that since the trial court elected not to terminate parental
rights, it could not immediately place the children in a permanent
guardianship.89 Thus, the case went back to the trial court on questions of the
least alternative means and manifest best interest.90 What brought the case back
to the appellate court was the question of whether the trial court was obligated
to consider new circumstances in determining whether termination was in the
best interest of the children.91 Reviewing the facts of the case, the appellate
court reversed and remanded again, finding that it could not say for certain that
the trial court would not have decided that the circumstances warranted an
adjudication of dependency instead of termination of parental rights as a matter
of best interests of the child.92
Finally, in A.J. v. Department of Children & Families,93 the appellate
court reversed as to the failure of the trial court to make proper findings as to
the grounds for termination of parental rights.94 Specifically, the appellate court
found that there was no substantial evidence of significant harm to the sons, and
was further “troubled by the court’s finding[] that the parents could not provide
the children with necessities, [as] [t]here was no testimony establishing the
parents’ financial situation and . . . no evidence that [they] could not . . . provide
for their children.”95 In fact, the trial court denied the mother’s attorney the
right to shed light on another issue—the children’s referral to therapy by their
mother—on grounds that the question was irrelevant.96 The trial court further
83.
FLA. STAT. § 39.809(1); see, e.g., 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 50/1(1)(D)(f) (2014).
84.
FLA. STAT. § 39.810; see, e.g., 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 50/1(1)(D)(m-1).
85.
Padgett v. Dep’t of Health & Rehabilitative Servs., 577 So. 2d 565, 571 (Fla.
1991); K.D. v. Dep’t of Children & Family Servs. (In re Z.C. II), 132 So. 3d 877, 879 (Fla. 2d
Dist. Ct. App. 2014); see also FLA. STAT. § 39.6012(3)(d).
86.
132 So. 3d 877 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2014).
87.
Id. at 878.
88.
Dep’t of Children & Family Servs. v. K.D. (In re Z.C. I), 88 So. 3d 977, 979
(Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2012) (en banc).
89.
Id. at 988–89.
90.
Id. at 989.
91.
In re Z.C. II, 132 So. 3d at 879.
92.
Id. at 879–80.
93.
126 So. 3d 1212 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2012) (per curiam). This was a 2012
case that was reported in 2013.
94.
Id. at 1215.
95.
Id.
96.
Id. at 1214.
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compounded its errors by relying on “hearsay accounts regarding one of the
young[] boys and one of the father’s daughters acting out sexually.”97
IV.

STATUS OFFENSES—CHILDREN IN NEED OF SERVICES

Chapter 984, entitled “Children and Families in Need of Services,”
deals with status offenders.98 A “child in need of services” concerns children
who have committed an act, which if committed by an adult would not be a
crime.99 Under Florida law, this includes children who persistently run away,
are “habitually truant from school,” and who “persistently disobey[] the
reasonable and lawful demands of [their] parents.”100 This statute begins with
the following statement of purpose:
To provide judicial and other procedures to assure due
process through which children and other interested parties are
assured fair hearings by a respectful and respected court or other
tribunal[s] and the recognition, protection, and enforcement of their
constitutional and other legal rights, while ensuring that public safety
interests and the authority and dignity of the courts are adequately
protected.101

It appears clear from the Second District Court of Appeal ruling in
Moyers v. State102 that the trial court failed to comply with the enabling
language of the statute.103 In that case, a father “appeal[ed] two orders finding
him in indirect criminal contempt for failing to comply with truancy orders” that
obligated him to ensure that his daughter attended school.104 According to the
appellate court, there was no evidence presented at the first of two hearings
regarding an order to show cause, and that the evidence presented at the second
hearing showed only that the father’s daughter had been absent or departed from
school on several days.105 In fact, according to the appellate court, what the
evidence did show was that the child’s medical condition caused her not to
attend school for several days.106 There was no evidence of the father’s willful

97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

Published by NSUWorks, 2014
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See FLA. STAT. § 984.01 (2014).
See id. § 984.03(9).
Id. § 984.03(9)(a)–(c).
Id. § 984.01(1)(a).
127 So. 3d 827 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2013).
Id. at 828; see also FLA. STAT. § 984.01(1)(a).
Moyers, 127 So. 3d at 827–28.
Id. at 828.
Id.
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failure to assure the child’s attendance.107 Rather, according to the appellate
court, “[t]he truancy . . . judge improperly acted as the judge and the prosecutor,
and the evidence was insufficient to establish Mr. Moyers’ willful
noncompliance with the truancy court’s order[].”108 Seeing “the truancy judge’s
improper role in the proceedings as prosecut[or], and because” there was no
evidence to support the finding, the appellate court reversed.109 In so doing, it
recognized that it had previously ruled in exactly the same fashion in a prior
case involving the same trial judge.110
An important question of the proximity of the status offense to a
delinquency offense arose recently in M.J. v. State.111 In that case, a juvenile
appealed from an adjudication of delinquency.112 The claim was that the trial
court had denied the juvenile’s “motion to suppress his confession . . . from
what [was] claim[ed] [to be] an illegal detention for loitering and prowling.”113
Under the facts of the case, the court determined that the motion should have
been suppressed because the reasonable stop of the juvenile by the police was
for truancy, and thus, there was no “probable cause to arrest the juvenile for
loitering and prowling.”114 According to the appellate court, during mid-day
hours, a deputy sheriff noticed a juvenile “in front of a house in a high crime
area.”115 The officer knew from prior dealings that the juvenile should have
been in school.116 When the officer made a U-turn in his vehicle, the juvenile
ran away, and the officer subsequently found the juvenile “lying along the
concrete wall inside the porch” of the house.117 The officer then read the
juvenile his Miranda rights and subsequently the juvenile confessed to a
burglary.118 The appeals court found that the police officer saw the juvenile and
“suspected him of being a truant, not . . . committing a crime.”119 Thus, there
was no probable cause for the arrest for loitering and prowling.120

107.
108.
109.
110.

Id.
Id.
Moyers, 127 So. 3d at 828.
Id. (referencing Sockwell v. State, 123 So. 3d 585, 592 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.

2012)).
111.
121 So. 3d 1151, 1153 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2013), review denied, 133 So.
3d 528 (Fla. 2014).
112.
Id. at 1153.
113.
Id.
114.
Id.
115.
Id.
116.
M.J., 121 So. 3d at 1153.
117.
Id.
118.
Id.
119.
Id. at 1155.
120.
Id.
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JUVENILE DELINQUENCY

The issue before the Supreme Court of Florida during this survey year
was the question of proper interpretation of the speedy trial rule in delinquency
cases.121 The specific issue in State v. S.A.122 was how to compute what is
referred to as the speedy trial rule’s recapture window.123 The issue arose from
a conflict in two of the district courts of appeal.124 In S.A., the appellate issue
arose when the juvenile “filed a notice of expiration of speedy trial and a motion
seeking discharge under the speedy trial rule.”125 The motion required
application of the trial rule’s recapture window found in the Florida Rules of
Juvenile Procedure.126 The recapture rule says that “[n]o later than [five] days
from the date of the filing of [the] motion for discharge, the court [is obligated
to] hold a hearing on the motion.”127 Then, “unless the court finds that one of
the reasons set forth in subdivision (d) [of the rule] exists . . . the respondent
[must] be brought to trial within [ten] days” and if not, and “through no fault of
the respondent, the respondent [is] . . . discharged.”128 The specific technical
question was whether the rule provides for one fifteen-day time period based
upon the five- and ten-day provisions, or whether the calculation of the
recapture window is based upon two separate, but interrelated time periods of
five and ten days.129 Analyzing the legislative history—and over a dissent and
two concurrences—the plurality ruling was “that the recapture window is
comprised of two separate time periods.”130
The Supreme Court of the United States’ rulings in Miller v. Alabama131
and Graham v. Florida132 have generated a growing body of interpretive case
law in Florida and in other jurisdictions.133 In Mason v. State,134 the specific
question the appellate court dealt with was if the application of Miller, which
121.
See State v. S.A., 133 So. 3d 506, 507 (Fla. 2014) (per curiam).
122.
133 So. 3d 506 (Fla. 2014) (per curiam).
123.
Id. at 507.
124.
Id.; see also State v. S.A., 96 So. 3d 1133, 1135 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
2012), reh’g granted, 2013 Fla. Lexis 881 (Fla. 2013), quashed, 133 So. 3d 506 (Fla. 2014); State
v. McFarland, 747 So. 2d 481, 483 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
125.
S.A., 133 So. 3d at 507.
126.
FLA. R. JUV. P. 8.090(m)(3); S.A., 133 So. 3d at 507–08.
127.
FLA. R. JUV. P. 8.090(m)(3); S.A., 133 So. 3d at 508.
128.
FLA. R. JUV. P. 8.090(m)(3).
129.
S.A., 133 So. 3d at 509.
130.
Id.
131.
No. 10-9646, slip op. (U.S. June 25, 2012).
132.
560 U.S. 48 (2010).
133.
See Miller, No. 10-9646, slip op. at 2; Graham, 560 U.S. at 82; 1 MICHAEL J.
DALE ET AL., REPRESENTING THE CHILD CLIENT ¶ 5.03(13)(e)(iii) (2014).
134.
134 So. 3d 499 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2014) (per curiam).
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had held that a sentencing law “requir[ing] a mandatory sentence of life in
prison without . . . parole for a juvenile, [was violative of] the Eighth
Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.”135 In the
Mason case, the juvenile “negotiated [a] plea to second-degree murder . . . and
received life in prison with a fifteen-year mandatory minimum as a [violent
habitual] felony offender.”136 Because the statute under which the juvenile was
punished did not contain a requirement of mandatory life in prison without
parole, Miller did not apply, according to the appellate court.137 Although the
court employed discretion at the trial level to impose a higher sentence than it
could have, nothing indicated that the court did not take Mason’s youth into
account when determining the sentence.138 The appellate court thus affirmed.139
In Weiand v. State,140 the juvenile appealed an order denying his motion
for post-conviction relief.141 Based upon the defendant’s pro se appeal, the
intermediate appellate court held that the sentence of life in prison without
parole on kidnapping and robbery convictions was illegal under Graham v.
State.142 Applying Graham, the appellate court held that “the Supreme Court
[of the United States] created a bright-line rule . . . that a defendant . . . under
eighteen, when” he or she commits a “non-homicide offense [could not] be
sentenced to life without parole.”143
Lack of probable cause for an arrest of a juvenile for loitering,
described in the M.J. case above, has arisen on several occasions in the
appellate courts.144 Thus, in C.C. v. State,145 a juvenile “was adjudicated
delinquent on charge[s] of loitering and prowling,” appealed the adjudication,
and the appellate court reversed, finding there was a failure to establish a
completed offense of loitering and prowling.146 The case arose when police
officers in the City of Hollywood at about ten o’clock in the morning noticed a
135.
Id. at 500; see also Miller, No. 10-9646, slip op. at 2; DALE ET AL., supra note
133, at ¶ 5.03(13)(e)(iii).
136.
See Mason, 134 So. 3d at 500.
137.
Id.; see also Miller, No. 10-9646, slip op. at 2.
138.
See Mason, 134 So. 3d at 501.
139.
Id.
140.
129 So. 3d 434 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2013).
141.
Id. at 434.
142.
Id. at 435; see also Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 82 (2010).
143.
Weiand, 129 So. 3d at 435 (emphasis added); see also Graham, 560 U.S. at
82.
144.
See C.C. v. State, 137 So. 3d 466, 467 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.), review
denied, No. SC14-960, 2014 WL 4291798 (Fla. Aug. 29, 2014); M.J. v. State, 121 So. 3d 1151,
1153 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2013), review denied, 133 So. 3d 528 (Fla. 2014); supra text
accompanying notes 111–20.
145.
137 So. 3d 466 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.), review denied, No. SC14-960, 2014
WL 4291798 (Fla. Aug. 29, 2014).
146.
Id. at 467.
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juvenile who the officers believed should have been in school.147 “When the
officers stopped their patrol car [the respondent] and two other[s] . . . dropped
their backpacks in a bush and [tried to hide] behind a truck.”148 The officers
arrested the respondent, searched his backpack, and found a four-way lug
wrench and other tools.149 At trial, respondent moved to dismiss, which was
denied, and the defense then rested.150 The appellate court held “that the items
found . . . after [the] arrest should not have been admitted [as evidence] or
considered by the trial court because the offense of loitering and prowling [was
not] completed.”151 In fact, the appellate court held that, under the law, it must
be found that the respondent was loitering and prowling at a place and in a
manner not usual for law-abiding citizens, that loitering was under
circumstances that warranted alarm or concern for the safety of others, and that
these elements were completed prior to the arrest.152 Significantly, the appellate
court held that it was unable to distinguish the C.C. case from M.J.153
Recognizing the nearly identical facts, the court held that the State had failed to
prove that the elements of the offense occurred in the officers’ presence.154 It
thus reversed.155
In a third similar case, G.T. v. State,156 the juvenile appealed from a
conviction “for resisting an officer without violence when she refused to
[provide] the arresting officer [with] her name and personal information after
[she was] detained [on] suspicion of underage drinking and disorderly
intoxication.”157 In order to detain someone, the “officer must have reasonable
suspicion of criminal activity by” that individual.158 In this case, the State was
unable to demonstrate the facts that connected the child to an empty liquor
bottle or to show that the police officer “had more than an inchoate hunch that
this group of juveniles was the one [that] he had been dispatched to
investigate.”159 The only information that the officer had was that the juveniles
appeared to have “red [and] glossy eyes and slurred speech, [suggesting] to the
147.
Id.
148.
Id.
149.
Id.
150.
C.C., 137 So. 3d at 467.
151.
Id.
152.
Id. at 468–69 (quoting E.F. v. State, 110 So. 3d 101, 104 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App.), review denied, 121 So. 3d 1038 (Fla. 2013)).
153.
Id. at 468; see also M.J. v. State, 121 So. 3d 1151, 1153 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 2013), review denied, 133 So. 3d 528 (Fla. 2014).
154.
C.C., 137 So. 3d at 469.
155.
Id. at 469–70.
156.
120 So. 3d 141 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2013) (per curiam).
157.
Id. at 142.
158.
Id. at 143.
159.
Id.

Published by NSUWorks, 2014

13

Nova Law Review, Vol. 39, Iss. 1 [2014], Art. 2

50

NOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39

officer that they were intoxicated.”160 However, the officer observed this after
he detained the juvenile.161 The court thus reversed.162
The fourth lack of reasonable suspicion case is A.R. v. State.163 In this
case, the act of delinquency alleged was resisting an officer without violence.164
“Boynton Beach police were ‘investigating a . . . crime that [may have] taken
place’ in a public park.”165 When officers arrived, the appellant turned away
and started to run.166 The officer yelled at the individual to stop a number of
times, and the youth ultimately gave up and surrendered.167 The juvenile’s
argument on appeal was that the police investigation of the crime could not be
the basis to legally detain a person where there was no reasonable suspicion of
probable cause as to that individual.168 Running away—the court held based on
prior case law—“is not sufficient to establish [a] reasonable suspicion where
there is no evidence to demonstrate that the flight took place in a high crime
area.”169 Further, there was no showing that the flight obstructed the officers in
the lawful execution of their duties.170 The court thus reversed.171
Issues of detention, ranging from home detention through secure
detention, appear regularly in the appellate case law.172 The issue in H.D. v.
Shore173 was whether a child could be held in secure detention based upon a
prior arrest for burglary of a dwelling and grand theft offenses, which by
themselves did not score sufficiently on Florida’s Risk Assessment Instrument
(“RAI”) for secure detention, but when the juvenile failed to go to school, the
father reported the violation and the court then ordered secure detention.174 The
appellate court ruled that Florida’s juvenile detention statute does not provide a
court with the authority to order secure detention solely on the basis of a
violation of a pre-adjudication home detention.175 The appellate court then
explained that the remedy for such a violation was indirect contempt.176
160.
Id.
161.
G.T., 120 So. 3d at 143.
162.
Id. at 143–44.
163.
127 So. 3d 650, 652 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2013).
164.
Id.
165.
Id.
166.
Id.
167.
Id. at 652–53.
168.
A.R., 127 So. 3d at 653.
169.
Id. at 654.
170.
Id.
171.
Id. at 655.
172.
Dale, 2013 Survey of Juvenile Law, supra note 58, at 93; see, e.g., H.D. v.
Shore, 134 So. 3d 1062, 1062 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2013) (per curiam).
173.
134 So. 3d 1062 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2013) (per curiam).
174.
Id. at 1062–63.
175.
Id. at 1063; see also FLA. STAT. § 985.255 (2014).
176.
H.D., 134 So. 3d at 1063.
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Therefore, the appellate court held that as the child did not score enough points
under Florida’s RAI for secure detention, and there were no findings to depart
from the RAI, secure detention was improper.177 The court thus granted the writ
of habeas corpus.178 It should be noted that the court in H.D. disagreed with the
court in K.T.E. v. Lofthiem,179 that section 985.265(1) of the Florida Statutes
“provides an independent basis for ordering secure detention” under the facts in
the H.D. case.180
Evidentiary issues are not usually part of this juvenile survey as they
are generic to any variety of litigation settings.181 However, a recent Fourth
District Court of Appeal case, T.D.W. v. State182 is worthy of discussion as it
deals with best evidence.183 The issue before the court was “whether [the]
appellant was [properly] identified as one of the three boys who burgl[arized] a
home.”184 His “identification was based in part on the [detective’s]
testimony.”185 The detective testified that “she saw [the appellant] on a
surveillance videotape [that] she [had] viewed outside the courtroom.”186
However, the “identification did not appear on the copy of the surveillance
video offered into evidence at trial.”187 Florida Rule of Evidence 90.952
provides in relevant part that “[e]xcept as otherwise provided by statute, an
original writing, recording, or photograph is required in order to prove the
contents of the writing, recording, or photograph.”188 Known as the Best
Evidence Rule, unless an exception may be shown, “‘the testimony of [the]
witness . . . [regarding] the contents of the original is inadmissible.’”189 Finding
that the error was not harmless, citing similar case law, the appellate court
reversed.190
The issue of whether Second Amendment constitutional rights apply to
juveniles was before the Fourth District Court of Appeal in L.S. v. State.191 A
177.
Id. at 1064.
178.
Id. at 1062, 1064.
179.
915 So. 2d 767 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2005).
180.
H.D., 134 So. 3d. at 1063–64; see also FLA. STAT. § 985.265(1); K.T.E., 915
So. 2d at 769–70.
181.
See Dale, 2013 Survey of Juvenile Law, supra note 58, at 84.
182.
137 So. 3d 574 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2014).
183.
Id. at 575.
184.
Id.
185.
Id.
186.
Id.
187.
T.D.W., 137 So. 3d at 575.
188.
FLA. STAT. § 90.952 (2014).
189.
T.D.W., 137 So. 3d at 576; see also FLA. STAT. § 90.952.
190.
T.D.W., 137 So. 3d at 577–78; see also McKeehan v. State, 838 So. 2d 1257,
1261 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
191.
120 So. 3d 55, 58 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2013).
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juvenile was adjudicated delinquent based upon “carrying a concealed firearm,
grand theft of a firearm, improper exhibition of a firearm, [and] resisting arrest
without violence [as well as] possession of a firearm by a minor.”192 The
appellate court reversed as to all adjudications with the exception of carrying a
concealed firearm.193 As to that adjudication, the minor argued that he had a
right under the Second Amendment to the United States Constitution to carry
the firearm as there is no juvenile exception in the Amendment.194 The
appellate court held that the constitutional rights of children are not equated
with those of adults on the basis of the juvenile’s “inability to make decisions in
an informed and mature manner.”195 Citing basic United States Constitutional
law, the court held that while the Second Amendment does not mention
juveniles, the Supreme Court of the United States has recognized limitations on
the right to bear arms.196 The court also commented that the constitutional
rights of children under the Florida Constitution are not the same as adults, as
well as under the laws of other states.197 The court therefore affirmed the
adjudication of possession of firearms by a minor.198
Florida provides that incompetency may be grounds under which a
proceeding to determine delinquency may not proceed and that ultimately the
charges under certain circumstances may be dismissed.199 The basis for
incompetence may be age, immaturity, a mental illness, intellectual disability,
or autism.200 The question before the Fourth District Court of Appeal in D.B. v.
State,201 was whether dismissal of a delinquency petition was mandated as the
juvenile had been declared incompetent more than three years earlier and
remained incompetent.202 Under the Florida Statutes, and pursuant to due
process principles, a juvenile may not be tried while incompetent.203 The
statutes also provide a jurisdictional limit on how long the court may retain
jurisdiction.204 Here, under the statute and as conceded by the State, dismissal
was warranted.205
192.
Id. at 56.
193.
Id. at 59.
194.
Id. at 58; see also U.S. CONST. amend. II.
195.
L.S., 120 So. 3d at 58.
196.
U.S. CONST. amend. II.; but see In re T.W., 551 So. 2d 1186, 1193 (Fla.),
withdrawn, 1989 Lexis 1226 (Fla. 1989).
197.
L.S., 120 So. 3d at 59.
198.
Id.
199.
FLA. STAT. § 985.19(1), (5)(c) (2014).
200.
See id. § 985.19(2), (3)(a).
201.
120 So. 3d 71 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2013).
202.
Id. at 72.
203.
Id. at 73; see also FLA. STAT. § 985.19(1).
204.
FLA. STAT. § 985.19(5)(c).
205.
D.B., 120 So. 3d at 72.
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The issue of waiver of Miranda rights by juveniles is a very common
issue that arises in the appellate courts all over the country.206 That issue was
before the appellate court in J.X. v. State.207 In that case, a juvenile appealed the
denial of his motion to suppress statements he provided to the police after being
given his Miranda warnings, which he then waived.208 The juvenile was
seventeen and was summoned to the police station with his mother.209 There
was a suspicion that he had been involved in burglaries.210 As soon as he was
advised that he had been asked to come to the police station because of the two
residential burglaries, he unequivocally invoked his right to counsel.211 The
police officer “closed his case file and terminated the interview.”212 However,
after the detective said he was going to speak to the juvenile’s brother, the
mother encouraged the appellant to cooperate.213 After the juvenile reinitiated
contact with the officer, the officer advised the juvenile again of his Miranda
rights, giving him the form containing the full recitation and orally advising
him.214 The juvenile then confessed.215 The appellate court held that when the
juvenile reinstituted contact with the police—where there was no threat of
coercion and where the juvenile did not ask for a lawyer—the waiver was free,
voluntary, and knowing.216 It then affirmed the denial of the motion to
suppress.217
Florida’s delinquency statute provides a number of dispositional
alternatives including probation, restitution, community service, revocation of
driver’s licenses, and attendance at school.218 Restitution issues often come up
before the appellate courts on proper application of the Florida Statute.219 In
T.J.J. v. State,220 a juvenile appealed an order of disposition—including
restitution—after he admitted to a burglary of a dwelling.221 The issue was that
the restitution order included a payment for “items not listed in the original
206.
E.g., J.X. v. State, 125 So. 3d 364, 365 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2013); see also
DALE ET AL., supra note 133, at ¶ 5.03(7).
207.
125 So. 3d 364, 365 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2013).
208.
Id. at 365.
209.
Id.
210.
Id.
211.
Id.
212.
J.X., 125 So. 3d at 365.
213.
Id.
214.
Id.
215.
Id.
216.
Id. at 367.
217.
J.X., 125 So. 3d at 367.
218.
FLA. STAT. § 985.455(1)–(2) (2014).
219.
Dale, 2013 Survey of Juvenile Law, supra note 58, at 94.
220.
121 So. 3d 635 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2013).
221.
Id. at 637.
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charging document.”222 The amount of restitution was “$2718, or more than
twice what the charging document,” set forth.223 The appeals court reversed for
failure to comply with the statute, which provides that restitution is based upon
the charging document.224
In V.A.C. v. State,225 the issue involving an order of restitution dealt
with a jurisdictional problem.226 In that case, the juvenile turned nineteen, and a
notice of hearing to establish restitution was filed after the juvenile’s nineteenth
birthday.227 As a result, the juvenile court lacked jurisdiction.228 Having
reserved jurisdiction on the issue of restitution prior to the juvenile’s nineteenth
birthday, the trial court could have dealt with the matter.229 However, the “court
erred in ordering restitution after it lost jurisdiction.”230
If there is an allegation that a juvenile has violated probation, under
Florida law, the state may file a petition for violation of probation.231 In S.M. v.
State,232 the juvenile appealed the dispositional order which found her guilty of
violation of probation on the grounds that the juvenile had been ordered to leave
the courtroom to privately speak to her grandmother, and because the State
presented only hearsay evidence by the juvenile’s probation officer to support
the allegation.233 The appellate court held that “[w]hile ‘[h]earsay is admissible
in a revocation hearing,’” it cannot be the sole basis for the finding; in the case
at bar that was all the evidence.234 Thus, “there was insufficient evidence to
revoke the . . . probation on the two allegations contained [in] the petition.”235
Furthermore, “juveniles have a constitutional right to be present at all critical
stages of the proceeding[],” unless waived by the child himself or herself.236
Because “the juvenile did not personally waive her right to be present” and
because events took place while the juvenile was out of the courtroom—only to
be back to hear the disposition—the court also reversed.237
222.
Id.
223.
Id.
224.
Id.
225.
136 So. 3d 612 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2013).
226.
Id. at 613.
227.
Id.
228.
Id.
229.
Id.
230.
V.A.C., 136 So. 3d at 614.
231.
FLA. STAT. § 985.439(1)(b) (2014).
232.
138 So. 3d 1156 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2014).
233.
Id. at 1157, 1159.
234.
Id. at 1159 (quoting McNealy v. State, 479 So. 2d 138, 139 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct.
App. 1985)).
235.
Id.
236.
Id. at 1159–60 (quoting J.R. v. State, 953 So. 2d 690, 691 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct.
App. 2007) (per curiam)).
237.
S.M., 138 So. 3d at 1160.
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Another dispositional issue that comes up on occasion is the question of
the specifics of special conditions of juvenile probation.238 In T.J.J., in addition
to ordering “restitution for items not [contained] in the . . . charging document,
[t]he [trial] court also imposed [as] a special condition of . . . probation that the
[respondent] not associate with persons under supervision, members of gangs,
or whose contact [was] prohibited by the juvenile’s probation officer, parent or
guardian.”239 The appellate court reversed as to this condition of probation
finding that nothing in the Florida Statutes or the Rules of Juvenile Procedure
contained a “blanket prohibition of willful contact” with certain individuals.240
The rules’ “special condition [dealt with] prohibiting contact with the
victim[s].”241 Furthermore, the appellate court held that “the condition must be
related to the crime committed.”242 Finally, the appellate court held that “the
condition [was] invalid for vagueness and overbreadth.”243
Another example of police interaction with a juvenile during school
hours and their handling of them is R.A.S. v. State.244 In that case, a juvenile
appealed from a delinquency adjudication for “possession of marijuana and
drug paraphernalia” having unsuccessfully sought to suppress the evidence.245
A police officer was driving through the respondent’s neighborhood trying to
find him because the youngster had been reported absent from school.246 When
“[t]he deputy located [the student] and asked him to come over to talk to him,”
the student said he was on his way to school.247 The deputy offered to give the
student a ride to school, which the student accepted.248 The deputy then told the
youngster to empty his pockets, indicating that he was doing a weapons patdown.249 In so doing, the officer—realizing the student failed to entirely empty
his pockets—felt an item, which turned out to be a plastic bag of marijuana.250
The appellate court held that ordering someone to empty his pockets under these
circumstances was an unauthorized full search.251 “The deputy did not have . . .
238.
T.J.J. v. State, 121 So. 3d 635, 637 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2013); see also
FLA. STAT. § 985.435 (2014).
239.
T.J.J., 121 So. 3d at 637.
240.
Id. at 638–39; see also FLA. STAT. § 985.435; FLA. R. JUV. P. Form 8.947.
241.
T.J.J., 121 So. 3d at 638; see also FLA. R. JUV. P. Form 8.947.
242.
T.J.J., 121 So. 3d at 638 (citing Biller v. State, 618 So. 2d 734, 734–35 (Fla.
1993)).
243.
Id.
244.
141 So. 3d 687, 689 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2014).
245.
Id.
246.
Id.
247.
Id.
248.
Id.
249.
R.A.S., 141 So. 3d at 689.
250.
Id.
251.
Id.
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reason to [believe] that [the youngster] was carrying a weapon or contraband.
Thus, the initial search had no legal basis.”252 The court recognized that the
police officer did have the right to conduct the pat-down for weapons.253 But
when an officer takes a truant into custody, as here, “the only concern is for
officer safety,” which means the concern is about a weapon.254 Thus, the
appellate court reversed.255
Florida law provides a form of amnesty or immunity for school students
who divulge information related to the supplying of controlled substances if the
events giving rise to the incident “occurred on property other than public school
property.”256 In State v. E.M.,257 the State appealed the trial court’s granting of
the respondent juvenile’s motion in limine to preclude statements to school
officials.258 The case arose out of an internal suspension resulting from a
violation of the school dress code.259 The student told the school security
officials that he was out of dress code because “his uniform shirt was ‘messed
up.’”260 When the security officer asked the youngster to show the officer the
shirt and when the juvenile “opened his backpack to take out [his] shirt, [the]
[s]ecurity [officials] smelled the odor of marijuana.”261 As a result, the juvenile
admitted that he had the marijuana, which the security officer found in the
backpack.262 The State alleged two counts—possession of marijuana with intent
to deliver at the nearest school and marijuana subsequently found in the
juvenile’s home.263 As a matter of statutory interpretation, the appellate court
held that the immunity statute did not apply because the student did not fall
within the category of one who “divulges information leading to the arrest and
conviction of the person who supplied the controlled substance to him.”264
Rather, the student fell into the second category which did not receive the same
protection—which is to say inadmissibly of incriminating statements—as in the
first category.265 The appellate court therefore reversed.266

252.
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.
265.
266.
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Id.
Id. at 690.
R.A.S., 141 So. 3d at 690.
Id.
FLA. STAT. § 1006.09(2)(a) (2014).
141 So. 3d 682 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2014).
Id. at 683.
Id.
Id.
Id.
E.M., 141 So. 3d at 683.
Id.
Id. at 685 (citing FLA. STAT. § 1006.09(2)(a)(2014)).
Id.
Id. at 686.
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OTHER MATTERS

The role of Florida’s well-funded GAL Program has been discussed in
this law review on several occasions.267 In Turnier v. Stockman,268 the issue of
whether a guardian ad litem could be appointed arose in the context of a chapter
61 custody matter commenced as a paternity proceeding.269 The case
transferred from St. Johns County to Miami-Dade County, involved with whom
a deaf minor child should live, where both of the parents were deaf.270 The trial
court considered appointing a GAL, but ultimately did not.271 The mother
appealed, arguing that it was reversible error for the trial court to fail to appoint
a GAL for the child.272 The appellate court held that there was no requirement
to appoint a guardian in the proceeding below because the Florida Legislature
in, chapter 61, did not make the appointment mandatory, but rather
discretionary.273
The question of liability of what are known in Florida as the lead
agencies—the organizations to which the Department of Children and Families
outsource the provision of foster care and related services—was before the First
District Court of Appeal.274 The case—a wrongful death action arising out of
the death of a child in foster care—was brought against Partnership for Strong
Families, the community-based provider in several counties in the state.275 The
appellate court affirmed summary judgment for the provider, finding it owed no
duty to the child because the trial court had terminated protective supervision,
and thus the “negligence could not be the proximate cause of” the child’s
death.276 The death had occurred as a result of the action of the child’s father to
whom the child had been returned.277 Finding that the alleged negligence was
also unforeseeable, the appellate court affirmed the grant of the motion for
summary judgment.278 Thus, Castello v. Partnership for Strong Families,

267.
See, e.g., Dale & Reidenberg, supra note 15, at 323–32.
268.
139 So. 3d 397 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2014),.
269.
Id. at 398–400; see also FLA. STAT. § 61.401 (2014).
270.
Turnier, 139 So. 3d at 398.
271.
Id. at 399.
272.
Id. at 400.
273.
Id.; see also FLA. STAT. § 61.401.
274.
Castello v. P’ship for Strong Families, Inc., 117 So. 3d 62, 63–64 (Fla. 1st
Dist. Ct. App. 2013) (per curiam), review denied, 139 So. 3d 884 (Fla. 2014); see also FLA. STAT.
§ 39.0016(1)(b).
275.
Castello, 117 So. 3d at 63.
276.
Id. at 63–64.
277.
Id. at 63.
278.
Id. at 63–64.

Published by NSUWorks, 2014

21

Nova Law Review, Vol. 39, Iss. 1 [2014], Art. 2

58

NOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39

Inc.279 mirrors the Supreme Court of the United States ruling in DeShaney v.
Winnebago County Department of Social Services.280
Domestic violence matters unrelated to dependency proceedings can
also involve juveniles.281 Cannon v. Thomas282 is such a case.283 A student
appealed from a trial court order “granting a permanent injunction for protection
against repeat violence” arising out of the appellant child’s attack upon the
appellee child.284 The injunction was granted based upon a factual
determination that the appellant “brutally battered [a]ppellee’s daughter,
slamming her head against a concrete wall” near a convenience store.285 The
problem, according to the appellate court, is that the Florida statute requires two
incidents of violence in order to protect the minor child.286 Thus, while
recognizing the severity of the attack, as a matter of statutory construction, the
appellate court was obligated to vacate the injunction for protection against the
violence.287
VII.

LEGISLATIVE CHANGES

This year’s legislative changes in juvenile law demonstrate a new
emphasis on prevention and intervention,288 a commitment to utilizing trauma
informed care,289 and revised standards for detention centers.290 The Legislature
also increased protections for juvenile offenders by adding criminal penalties
for willful neglect on the part of Department of Juvenile Justice (“DJJ”)
employees.291 In dependency, the Legislature addressed a longstanding issue
relating to termination of parental rights for prospective child abuse, reversing
twenty years of case law that required a nexus between prior abuse and current
risk.292 The Legislature has also created a right to counsel for special needs
children in dependency actions.293 Other changes include new provisions for
279.
117 So. 3d 62 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2013) (per curiam), review denied, 139
So. 3d 884 (Fla. 2014).
280.
489 U.S. 189, 203 (1989); Castello, 117 So. 3d at 64.
281.
See FLA. STAT. § 784.046(2)(a) (2014).
282.
133 So. 3d 634 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2014).
283.
Id. at 635.
284.
Id.
285.
Id.
286.
FLA. STAT. § 784.046(1)(b); Cannon, 133 So. 3d at 635, 640.
287.
Cannon, 133 So. 3d at 635, 640.
288.
FLA. STAT. § 985.01(1)(a).
289.
Id. §§ 985.02(8), .03(52).
290.
Id. §§ 985.02(5), .03(44).
291.
Id. § 985.702(2)(a).
292.
See id. § 39.806(1)(f); Padgett v. Dep’t of Health & Rehabilitative Servs., 577
So. 2d 565, 571 (Fla. 1991).
293.
FLA. STAT. § 39.01305(3).
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addressing cases of medical neglect,294 and new provisions for reporting and
addressing deaths of children in department care.295 The Legislature also
extended the scope of the relative caregiver program to include non-relative
caregivers.296 On a lighter note, the Legislature has mandated a program to help
children in department care obtain their driver’s licenses.297
A.

Juvenile Delinquency Statutory Changes

This year, the Legislature has introduced a shift in the declared purpose
of the juvenile justice system by emphasizing the role of prevention,
intervention, treatment, and the importance of children’s families and
community support systems.298 To this end, the Legislature added section
985.17 of the Florida Statutes, describing the need for prevention services to
“decrease recidivism by addressing the needs of at-risk youth and their
families.”299 The new statute directs the DJJ to “develop the capacity for local
communities to serve their youth [through] engag[ing] faith and community
based organizations to provide” various volunteer services such as “chaplaincy
services, crisis intervention counseling, mentoring, and tutoring.”300 The statute
directs the DJJ to provide services such as literacy and recreation programs
targeted specifically at certain at-risk youth.301
The Legislature has also added an emphasis on trauma informed care
recognizing the role that trauma, such as “violence, physical or sexual abuse,
neglect, [and] medical difficulties,” plays in the child’s life.302 The DJJ is
directed to provide services to “be more supportive and avoid retraumatization,
[through] trauma-specific interventions that are designed . . . to facilitate
healing.”303
The shift toward prevention through family and community
involvement is also apparent in new guidelines for detention facilities.304
Facilities are to be placed close to the home communities of children they serve
to encourage family involvement.305 Further evidencing the transition to more

294.
295.
296.
297.
298.
299.
300.
301.
302.
303.
304.
305.
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See FLA. STAT. § 985.01(1)(a), (e).
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individualized services is the reduction of the maximum number of beds
allowed in facilities from 165 to 90.306
Lastly, the Legislature has filled a significant gap in protection of
juvenile offenders from harm at the hands of DJJ employees, volunteers, and
interns.307 Although the Florida Statutes provided criminal penalties for sexual
abuse of children within the juvenile justice system, there was no such provision
for employees alleged to have neglected a youth in the department’s custody.308
Although such incidences are uncommon, one recent highly publicized event
illustrated the need for legislative change.309 In 2011, an eighteen-year-old in
the department’s custody died of a brain hemorrhage after “guards refused to
call 911 for more than six hours” because they thought the young person was
faking.310 Unfortunately, the guards could not be charged with child neglect
because the person was eighteen and no longer legally a child.311 To address
instances such as this, the Legislature amended section 985.701 of the Florida
Statutes to define ‘“[j]uvenile offender’ [as a] person of any age . . . detained . . .
or committed to the custody of the department,” and created section 985.702
which makes “[w]illful and malicious neglect of a juvenile offender” a felony
offense.312 In addition, violation of these provisions is grounds for dismissal
and permanent disqualification from employment in the juvenile justice
system.313 Section 985.702 also imposes a duty on DJJ employees to report
instances of neglect and makes failure to do so a first-degree misdemeanor.314
B.

Dependency Statutory Changes

Perhaps the most significant practical change in substantive dependency
law was the legislative abrogation of the nexus test established by the Supreme
Court of Florida in Padgett v. Department of Health & Rehabilitative
Services315 in 1991.316 The Padgett nexus test—which has been applied for over
306.
FLA. H.R., FINAL BILL ANALYSIS, CS/HB 7055, Reg. Leg. Sess., at 3 (Fla.
2014); see also FLA. STAT. § 985.02(5)(c).
307.
FINAL BILL ANALYSIS, CS/HB 7055, at 17–18, see also FLA. STAT. § 985.702.
308.
FINAL BILL ANALYSIS, CS/HB 7055, at 17.
309.
Id.; Ana M. Valdes, Parents of Teen Who Died in Detention to Sue State,
PALM BEACH POST, Mar. 14, 2012, at B1.
310.
Lisa Rab, DJJ Supervisor Thought Eric Perez Was “Faking” As He Died in
Juvie Lockup, Officer Testifies, THE PULP (Mar. 9, 2012, 12:42 PM), http://
blogs.browardpalmbeach.com/pulp/2012/03/djj_eric_perez_death_grand_jury_report.php; see
also Valdes, supra note 309.
311.
Rab, supra note 310; see also FINAL BILL ANALYSIS, CS/HB 7055, at 17.
312.
FLA. STAT. §§ 985.701(1)(a)(1)(c), .702(2)(a)–(b).
313.
Id. § 985.702(2)(c).
314.
Id. § 985.702(3), (4)(a)–(b).
315.
577 So. 2d 565 (Fla. 1991).
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two decades317— mandated that termination of parental rights (“TPR”) based
upon the abuse of sibling or another child in the family must be predicated upon
a showing of a nexus between the harm to the other child, and imminent risk of
harm to the current child.318 The Legislature has eliminated this nexus
requirement in part, amending section 39.806 of the Florida Statutes to specify
that no proof of a nexus between prior conduct and potential harm to a sibling is
required in cases of prior egregious conduct, or those related to homicide of a
child or the other parent.319 Similarly, conviction of crime “that requires [a]
parent to register as a sexual predator” has been added as a grounds for TPR.320
Although several organizations provide attorney representation to
dependent children in some parts of the state on a limited basis, the Legislature
has recognized that children with special needs have a particular need for legal
representation.321 For this reason, the Legislature has extended a right to legal
representation for dependent children with certain special needs.322
Specifically, an attorney shall be provided for a child who is subject to any
proceeding under chapter 39 who resides or is being considered for placement
in a skilled nursing home or residential treatment center, is prescribed but
declines assent to psychotropic medication, has a developmental disability, or is
a victim of human trafficking.323
There is a series of serious infirmities in the new statute.324 First, it
leaves unrepresented many children with equally serious needs, as well as the
vast majority of the over twenty-eight thousand children who are before the
dependency court.325 There are several constitutional reasons why all these
other children are entitled to counsel.326 The fact that they are treated
316.
Id. at 57; see also FLA. STAT. § 39.806(1)(f); Fla. Prof’l Staff of the Comm.
On Appropriations, Bill Analysis and Fiscal Impact Statement, S. 1666, Reg. Sess., at 19 (2014).
317.
Dale, 2013 Survey of Juvenile Law, supra note 58, at 85.
318.
Padgett, 577 So. 2d at 571; Dale, 2013 Survey of Juvenile Law, supra note
58, at 85.
319.
FLA. STAT. § 39.806(1)(f), (h).
320.
Id. § 39.806(1)(n). Research discloses no legislative history for these
changes. FLA. STAT. § 39.806 (2013).
321.
FLA. STAT. § 39.01305(1)(a)(2). The legislation is a response to a 2012
warning issued by the United States Department of Justice threatening a law suit against the State
of Florida regarding Americans with Disabilities Act violations concerning severely disabled
children housed in nursing homes throughout the state. FLA. H.R., FINAL BILL ANALYSIS, CS/HB
561, Reg. Leg. Sess., at 3 (2014).
322.
FLA. STAT. § 39.01305(3).
323.
Id.
324.
See id. § 39.01305(1)–(9).
325.
See Dale & Reidenberg, supra note 15, at 311, 353; DCF Quick Facts, FLA.
DEP’T OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES, http://www.dcfstate.fl.us/general-information/quick-facts/cw
(last visited Nov. 9, 2014).
326.
Dale & Reidenberg, supra note 15, at 350–53.
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differently than those provided with lawyers raises a question of equal
protection.327 The failure to provide counsel at all to most children in Florida in
these cases may also be a denial of procedural due process.328
Second, the new law appropriates five million dollars to pay for lawyers
to represent the children.329 However, it says that, first, efforts must be made to
find volunteer lawyers.330 This itself is a problem because volunteer lawyers
have never been able to represent even a significant fraction of the children
before the dependency court.331 The decision to provide lawyers for children is
first made by the attorneys for the Department of Children and Families.332 The
law thus creates an ethical issue for department lawyers.333 Pursuant to the
Florida Rules of Professional Responsibility, the decision of whether a party
should be entitled to counsel is being made by a lawyer for another party.334
Moreover, the system for locating and training lawyers to represent children is
left to the GAL Program.335 This creates a similar ethical problem.336 Thus, one
party is training and choosing those lawyers who will represent another party.337
Third, the legislature never explained why the excess of thirty million
dollars that it has expended to fund the GAL Program every year is not adequate
to represent these children.338 Of course—as discussed in two articles by this
author in the Nova Law Review339—the first part of the answer may be that the
327.
Id.
328.
Id. at 311, 353.
329.
FLA. H.R., FINAL BILL ANALYSIS, CS/HB 561, Reg. Leg. Sess., at 4 (2014).
330.
FLA. STAT. § 39.01305(4)(a) (2014).
331.
See U. FLA. LEVIN COLL. LAW CTR. ON CHILDREN & FAMILIES & FLA’S
CHILDREN FIRST, LEGAL REPRESENTATION OF DEPENDENT CHILDREN 6 (2012). The failure to fund
volunteer lawyers to represent children is compounded by the influx of approximately 53,000
undocumented children into the United States and the efforts of bar associations to fund lawyers
for them. Melvin Felix & Mike Clary, Deutsch Vows to Fight for Undocumented Kids, SUN
SENTINEL (Dec. 18, 2014, 8:42 PM), http://www.sun-sentinel.com/news/politics/flundocumented-minors-folo-20141218-story.html; Mara Gay, As Child Immigrants Await Fate, a
Race for Counsel, WALL ST. J., Oct. 1, 2014, at A19; Jan Pudlow, Florida Lawyers Stand with
Unaccompanied Minors, FLA. B. NEWS, Oct. 1, 2014, at 1. Legal Aid Societies are overwhelmed
by need for pro bono lawyers to meet need of unaccompanied immigrant children. Gay, supra
note 331.
332.
FLA. STAT. § 39.01305(6); Dale & Reidenberg, supra note 15, at 308 n.10.
333.
Dale & Reidenberg, supra note 15, at 308 n.10, 352–53.
334.
R. REGULATING FLA. BAR 4-1.14(b); see also Dale & Reidenberg, supra note
15, at 311, 353.
335.
Dale & Reidenberg, supra note 15, at 323.
336.
See id. at 308 n.10, 323.
337.
See id.
338.
Id. at 362. The complete budget from all sources is actually higher. See
Michael Dale & Louis M. Reidenberg, The Kids Aren’t Alright: Every Child Should Have an
Attorney in Child Welfare Proceedings in Florida, 36 NOVA. L. REV. 345, 356, (2012).
339.
See Dale, 2012 Survey of Juvenile Law, supra note 58, at 338–39; Dale &
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GAL Program in Florida does not represent the legal interests of children in
dependency and termination of parental rights cases.340 The GAL Program is
not the child’s lawyer.341 Rather, the GAL Program, a party to dependency and
TPR cases in Florida, only represents the child’s best interests.342 The child, of
course, is a separate party in Florida.343 So the GAL Program’s lawyers cannot
ethically represent another party—the child.344 The second part of the answer
may be that, while the GAL Program describes itself as guardian angels, it tries
to be the child’s friend, has 145 lawyers on staff, and actually only represents
the best interests of half the children before the court; it is legally, ethically, and
structurally incapable of solving the complex legal problems of the children
before the dependency court.345
Until this year, chapter 39 did not contain any special provisions for
dealing with cases of medical neglect or those involving children with complex
medical needs.346 Because of this, “parents [could] be found . . . neglectful or
abusive [where the] observed problems [were] related to insufficient services or
a natural change in medical conditions.”347 To correct these shortcomings and
to ensure children are maintained in a minimally restrictive and nurturing
environment, provisions were added to ensure that reports of medical neglect
will be investigated by persons with specialized training,348 and a child
protective team investigating such a case must consult with a physician with
experience treating children with the same condition.349 The goal of these
changes is to use a family-centered approach to allow children to remain at
home where the parents are willing and able to meet the child’s medical needs
with services.350
Although this survey can only address a limited number of statutory
changes, there are several additional provisions that require mention.351 First,
the legislature has created multiple procedures and protocols related to the
Reidenberg, supra note 15, at 311.
340.
Dale & Reidenberg, supra note 15, at 311; see also FLA. GUARDIAN AD LITEM
PROGRAM, FLA. GUARDIAN AD LITEM 2009 ANNUAL REPORT 2, 5 (2009), available at
http://www.guardianadlitem.org/documents/GAL-2009AnnualReport.pdf.
341.
See Dale & Reidenberg, supra note 15, at 310–11, 327.
342.
Id. at 311, 327.
343.
See id. at 311.
344.
R. REGULATING FLA. BAR 4-1.7(a)(2); see also FLA. STAT. § 39.01(51) (2014).
345.
See Dale & Reidenberg, supra note 15, at 327, 330, 353.
346.
FLA. STAT. § 39.01(41)–(43); Fla. Prof’l Staff of the Comm. on
Appropriation, Bill Analysis and Fiscal Impact Statement, S. 1666, Reg. Sess., at 12 (2014).
347.
Fla. Bill Analysis and Fiscal Impact Statement, S. 1666 at 12.
348.
See FLA. STAT. § 39.3068(1).
349.
See id. § 39.303(1).
350.
Id. § 39.3068(2).
351.
See supra Part V.
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investigation and reporting of deaths and other incidents, involving children
either in the care of, or who have been investigated by, the department.352 The
relative caregiver program—which provides financial assistance to family
members willing to care for a dependent child—was extended to assist persons
who are not related to the child by blood or marriage.353 A three-year pilot
program was established to pay for the costs associated with obtaining a driver’s
license—including insurance—for children in foster care.354 Finally, multiple
provisions were added to increase the overall competence of child welfare
personnel, with an emphasis on increasing the number of employees with
bachelor’s and master’s degrees in social work.355
VIII.

CONCLUSION

The Legislature made substantial changes in the juvenile delinquency
and child welfare law.356 In the latter area, several of the changes contain major
constitutional infirmities.357 The Supreme Court of Florida heard only one
juvenile law case involving a statutory analysis of the speedy trial rule.358 And
finally, the intermediate appellate courts contained their long-standing approach
to significant oversight of trial court rulings in both delinquency and child
welfare areas.359

352.
See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 39.2015 (1).
353.
Id. § 39.5085(2)(a)(3).
354.
Id. § 409.1454(2).
355.
Id. § 402.403(1)–(6).
356.
See supra Part I.
357.
See supra Part V.
358.
State v. S.A., 133 So. 3d 506, 507 (Fla. 2014) (per curiam).
359.
See, e.g., S.L. v. Dep’t of Children & Families, 120 So. 3d 75, 77 (Fla. 4th
Dist. Ct. App. 2013) (per curiam).
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